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What’s in a Name? The Marginal Standard of Review of “Complex 
Economic Assessments” in EU Competition Enforcement 
Andriani Kalintiri
*
 
 
Abstract. Judicial control of the Commission’s complex economic appraisals in EU competition 
enforcement has long troubled both academics and practitioners. Despite the commonly shared feeling 
that the marginal standard of review, as applied by EU Courts, is not as deferential as one might fear, 
its operation remains shrouded in vagueness, due to difficulties in defining the notion of “complex 
economic evaluations” as the trigger for a less strict standard of control and due to the lack of a clear 
understanding as to the errors that may invalidate the Commission’s analysis. This article sheds light 
on the judicial scrutiny of complex economic assessments, and demonstrates that (a) complex 
economic evaluations may come in different varieties and should not be seen as a uniform group, (b) 
the manifest error of assessment test is not an intangible formula of judicial scrutiny, contingent on 
one’s subjective perception of “manifestness”, but targets four specific defects in the Commission’s 
analysis: failure to correctly assess the material facts of the case, failure to take into account a relevant 
factor, taking into account an irrelevant factor that distorted the analysis, and failure to satisfy the 
standard of proof, and (c)  EU Courts have three “aces” up their sleeve that may enable them to 
diminish the Commission’s margin of appreciation: economics, evidence review and Article 19(1) 
TEU. 
 
1. Introduction 
Matters of judicial review are not for the faint of heart. In the context of competition 
enforcement specifically, the question what standards of control the European Union (EU) 
Courts
1
 apply – or should apply - when they scrutinize the decisions of the European 
Commission whereby the authority finds a violation of Article 101 and/or Article 102 TFEU
2
 
or declares a concentration compatible or incompatible with the common market,
3
 has been 
the subject of considerable controversy. Recently, academic debates have focused on the 
fairness dimension of the problem. The increasing levels of antitrust fines, which are often 
classified as “criminal charges” in the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR have given rise to 
concerns that the intensity of the control that the EU Courts exercise over the Commission’s 
infringement decisions may fall short of the principle of effective judicial protection, as 
                                                          
*
 PhD London, LLM Cambridge, LLB Athens. I am very grateful to Pablo Ibáñez Colomo for his thoughts on an 
earlier version of the article as well as the editors for their helpful comments. 
1
Unless otherwise stated, in this article references to “EU Courts” or the “Courts” should be understood as 
reference to the General Court of the European Union (General Court) and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (ECJ). 
2
O.J. 2008, C 115/47, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
3
O.J. 2004, L 24/1, Council Regulation 2004/139/EC of 20 Jan. 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (EUMR – the Merger Regulation). 
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enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR)
4
 and inspired by the 
right to a fair trial.
5
 Fairness considerations aside, however, the problem goes much deeper. In 
view of the core function of judicial review in any system predicated on the rule of law, the 
operation of inappropriate standards of judicial scrutiny may at best put the legitimacy of law 
enforcement into doubt and at worst threaten the balance of powers among the respective 
institutions and undermine their accountability. For this reason, judicial control has 
diachronically offered a salient topic for academic reflection. 
Typically, the intensity with which EU Courts will examine the legality of the 
Commission’s decision is indicated by the applicable standard of review.6 In brief, there are 
two standards of scrutiny from which to choose: full review and marginal review.
7
 In 
principle, full review is the prevailing threshold of judicial control with respect to questions 
of law and fact and represents the strictest form of scrutiny that EU Courts may exercise. By 
contrast, marginal review is engaged where the Commission’s decision touches upon policy 
matters or entails complex economic assessments, and is thought to connote a more relaxed 
standard of control under which judicial intervention is confined to instances of “manifest 
errors of assessment” in the Commission’s decision.8 In relation to complex economic 
evaluations specifically, EU Courts have explained that their role is to verify “whether the 
relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the statement of reasons for the 
decision is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has 
been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers”.9 Therefore, there is a strong 
correlation between judicial deference and the margin of administrative appreciation: the less 
strict marginal review is, the more latitude the authority will enjoy in its decision-making. 
Although the issue is far from settled, the possible justifications for judicial deference to 
administrative decision-making have been relatively well documented in the literature.
10
 By 
                                                          
4
O.J. 2000, C 364/1 (2000/C 364/01), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). 
5See generally Talev, “ECHR implications in the EU competition enforcement”  in Due Process and Innovation 
in EU Competition Law, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 16 Apr. 2010, pp. 49-51; Forrester, “A 
bush in need of pruning: The luxuriant growth of light judicial review” in Ehlermann and Marquis (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition 
Cases (Hart Publishing, 2010); Bronckers and Vallery, “Fair and Effective competition policy in the EU: Which 
role for authorities and which role for the Courts after Menarini?”  8 European Competition Journal (2012), 
297; Derenne, “The scope of judicial review in EU economic cases” in Merola and Derenne (Eds.), The Role of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases (Bruylant, 2012), p. 85; Siragusa, 
“Annulment proceedings in antitrust cases (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) – Standard of judicial review over 
substantive issues” in Merola and Derenne, ibid., pp. 135-137. In the merger context: Cumming, Merger 
Decisions and the Rules of Procedure of the European Community Courts (Kluwer Law International, 2011), pp. 
228-230; Chirita, “Procedural rights in EU administrative competition proceedings: Ex ante – mergers” in 
Cauffman and Hao (Eds.), Procedural Rights in Competition Law (Springer, 2015). This article will not focus on 
the fairness dimension of the issue. 
6Bailey, “Scope of judicial review under Article 81 EC”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 1327-1360, at 1330; Prete and 
Nucara, “Standard of proof and scope of judicial review in EC merger cases: Everything clear after Tetra 
Laval?”, 26 ECLR (2005), 692-704, at 693. 
7See generally Türk, “Oversight of administrative rulemaking: Judicial review”, 19 EL Rev.  (2013), 126-142. 
8As is well known, marginal review and the concept of the “manifest error of assessment” originates from 
French administrative law (see e.g. Vincent, “L’erreur manifeste d'appréciation”, 142 La Revue Administrative 
(1971), 407-442. 
9
Case C-42/84, Remia v. Commission, EU:C:1985:327, para 34. 
10
See e.g. Arancibia, Judicial Review of Commercial Regulation (OUP, 2011), pp. 15-32. 
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contrast, the operation of the marginal standard of review in EU competition enforcement 
remains shrouded in vagueness, especially where complex economic evaluations are 
involved. Despite the plethora of articles on the topic, academics and practitioners alike are 
still struggling to grasp fully under what circumstances EU Courts are likely to take fault with 
the Commission’s decision-making and what errors may strike a fatal blow to the lawfulness 
of its analysis. This haziness is particularly acute in relation to the content of the “manifest 
error of assessment” test. Indeed, the duty to state reasons, the obligation to comply with the 
relevant procedural rules and the requirement that the facts be accurately stated have not 
caused much worry, because – ironically enough – they are essentially subject to full control 
as questions of law and fact.
11
 Consequently, the gist of marginal review appears to lie in the 
meaning of the “manifest error of appraisal” test. The latter, however, remains far from 
obvious, in part due to the somewhat ambiguous language of EU Courts and in part due to the 
fact that from time to time the intensity of their judicial scrutiny seems at variance with their 
promises. 
Against this backdrop, the aim of the present article is to contribute to the academic 
efforts to understand marginal review in EU competition enforcement by investigating the 
operation of the “manifest error of assessment” test which underpins the judicial control of 
complex economic evaluations.
12
 To this end, the article is structured as follows: section 2 
offers a brief account of the historical evolution of the limited standard of review of complex 
economic appraisals in the case law of EU Courts. Taking note of this evolution, section 3 
then considers the efforts that have been made so far to define, first, the concept of complex 
economic evaluations as the trigger for a less strict form of judicial control and, second, the 
criterion of “manifestness” as the threshold for judicial intervention. As will be explained, 
                                                          
11
In this sense, the expanded version of marginal review in Remia is rather “self-repeating” and thus not very 
helpful. See Schweitzer, “The European competition law enforcement system and the evolution of judicial 
review” in Ehlermann and Marquis, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 100-101.   
12
This article will not consider the operation of marginal review in relation to policy matters. The Commission’s 
appreciation in relation to complex economic evaluations must not be confused with its discretion concerning 
policy choices, such as the design of its fining strategy (Case C-322/07 P, Papierfabrik August Koehler and 
Others v. Commission, EU:C:2009:500, para 112; also see Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed 
pursuant to Art. 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003, O.J. 2006/C 210/02, para 2), or the setting of enforcement 
priorities through the handling of complaints (Case T-193/02, Piau v. Commission, EU:T:2005:22, para 80; Case 
T-229/05, AEPI v. Commission, EU:C:2007:224, para 38), or the choice of its preferred enforcement tool (see 
e.g. DG Competition, “To commit or not to commit: Deciding between prohibition and commitments”, 3 
Competition Policy Brief (2014), 1). The conceptual difference between discretion and appreciation was 
clarified by A.G. Léger in his Opinion in Case C-40/03 P, Rica Foods v. Commission, EU:C:2005:93, paras. 45-
49. As A.G. Léger explains, it is possible to distinguish between the “political discretion” that the institutions 
enjoy “where they act in their capacity as political authorities and, in particular, where they legislate in a given 
field or where they lay down guidelines for a Community policy”, and  the “technical discretion” that they are 
allowed “where they act in their capacity as ‘administrative’ authorities and, in particular, where they adopt 
individual decisions in competition or State aid matters, and also where they take specific protective measures 
against dumping”. As he rightly observes, political discretion is justified “by the fact that the institutions must 
generally reconcile divergent interests and thus select options within the context of the policy choices which are 
their responsibility”, whereas technical discretion is justified “by the complexity of the technical, economic and 
legal situations they have to examine and of the assessments which they have to make”. See also Castillo de la 
Torre, “Evidence, proof and judicial review in cartel cases” in Ehlermann and Marquis, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 
390-391. Cf. Fritzsche, “Discretion, scope of judicial review and institutional balance in European law”, 47 
CML Rev. (2010), 361-403, 364. Hereafter, general references to marginal review must be understood as 
references to the marginal review of complex economic evaluations only. 
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these endeavours, albeit remarkable, have not been entirely successful in clarifying marginal 
review not only because positively defining complexity is an almost impossible feat, but also 
because the qualification of “manifestness” does not illuminate in itself what the problem is 
in the Commission’s analysis. With this in mind, section 4 shifts the focus to two slightly 
different questions: first, rather than wrestling with the concept of “complexity”, section 4.1 
concentrates on identifying the stages of the Commission’s analysis at which the performance 
of complex economic evaluations may be necessary for the authority to reach a decision on 
whether EU competition rules have been complied with. Second, instead of fiddling with the 
meaning of “manifestness”, section 4.2 ponders on what may make for a “manifest error of 
assessment” and analyses the competition jurisprudence of EU Courts with a view to 
inferring what marginal review entails. For the sake of completeness, section 4.3 then gives 
some thought to the reverse question, i.e. what may not make for such an error according to 
the case law of EU Courts. As the article will demonstrate, complex economic evaluations 
may come in different varieties and thus it is misleading to think of them as a purely uniform 
group. Furthermore, far from being an intangible concept, the “manifest error of assessment” 
test has – as will be shown – a quite specific content and encompasses four distinct types of 
errors. In light of those remarks, section 5 turns its attention to EU Courts and explores the 
tools that they may make use of when they scrutinize the Commission’s complex economic 
evaluations. As will be explained, EU judges have three important “aces” up their sleeve, 
which may enable them to shrink the Commission’s margin of appreciation to the bare 
minimum: economics, evidence review, and Article 19(1) TEU. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Evolution of the Marginal Standard of Review of Complex 
Economic Assessments 
Before examining in closer detail the marginal standard of review of complex economic 
assessments, it is worthwhile recalling the “birth” of this concept and its evolution. The 
origins of this form of hands-off judicial scrutiny go as far back as the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community.
13
  More specifically, Article 33(1) ECSC provided that 
a decision or recommendation of the High Authority could be contested on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any 
rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. Nevertheless, judicial scrutiny was 
subject to an important qualification: the Court could not examine “the evaluation of the 
situation resulting from economic facts or the circumstances in the light of which the High 
Authority took its decision or made its recommendation”. In these circumstances, the Court 
was only allowed to check whether the High Authority had misused its powers or had 
manifestly failed to observe the provisions of the ECSC Treaty or of any rule of law relating 
to its application. When the Treaty of Rome was later adopted in 1957, the equivalent Article 
173 featured the exact same four possible grounds for annulment of a Commission decision. 
However, references to “evaluations resulting from economic facts” or “the circumstances” in 
which decisions are made had been carefully deleted and no equivalent wording had been 
                                                          
13
Treaty of Paris, Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951). 
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inserted. The initial Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome survived essentially unscathed in all 
the Treaties that were to come, its latest version now being Article 263 TFEU.
14
 
Nevertheless, the early exclusion from the text of the Treaties of any reference to 
“evaluations resulting from economic facts” as signposting a less intrusive form of judicial 
control made little difference. The seed had been already irrevocably sown and the 
replacement concept of “complex economic assessments” made its appearance in the case 
law. In its seminal Consten and Grundig ruling, the ECJ expressly accepted that “the exercise 
of the Commission’s powers necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic 
matters”.15 The presence of complex economic assessments in the Commission’s competition 
decision-making is not of a merely academic interest. On the contrary, it has a direct practical 
implication: where complex economic assessments are involved, the Commission enjoys a 
margin of appreciation, which in turn connotes a lower threshold of judicial scrutiny. In 
Consten and Grundig the Court explained that “a judicial review of [complex] evaluations 
[on economic matters] must take account of their nature by confining itself to an examination 
of the relevance of the facts and of the legal consequences which the Commission deduces 
therefrom”.16  Since then, the judicial approach has gradually shifted to a seemingly stricter 
model. In Remia, the Court elaborated that such review includes “verifying whether the 
relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the statement of reasons for the 
decision is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has 
been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers”.17 Then, in Tetra Laval, the ECJ 
further elucidated that “whilst … the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to 
economic matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from 
reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature”.18 On the 
contrary, “not only must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence 
relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether the evidence contains 
all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation 
and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it”.19 Finally, 
Microsoft confirmed the relevance of this test – which came to be the standard formula of 
marginal review – not only for merger proceedings, but also for the control of Commission 
decisions concerning the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
20
 
                                                          
14
The first two paragraphs of this provision read: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the 
legality of legislative acts, of acts of … the Commission …. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions 
brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of 
law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.” 
15
Case C-56/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, EU:C:1966:41, p. 347. 
16
Ibid. 
17
Case C-42/84, Remia v. Commission, para 34. 
18
Case C-12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, EU:C:2005:87, para 39. 
19
Ibid. 
20
Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, EU:T:2007:289, paras. 87-89. 
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3. The Elusiveness Surrounding the Marginal Review of Complex 
Economic Assessments 
Admittedly, the marginal review of complex economic assessments seems to have 
incrementally progressed from childhood to maturity. Indeed, starting from what could be 
regarded as unconditional deference to the authority, EU Courts have gradually refined the 
initial crudeness of the limited review formula by setting out tighter criteria for their scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, although the test has become more sophisticated and elaborate, one cannot 
easily shed the nagging feeling that it remains as elusive as ever. If marginal review is the 
exception as the EU Courts’ jurisprudence suggests, one should then be able confidently to 
identify what activates its operation or how this form of judicial control differs from the full 
scrutiny to which Commission decisions are usually held. Therefore, it is only sensible that 
endeavours have been made, on the one hand, to define “complex economic assessments” – 
since it is their presence that is claimed to trigger the operation of a marginal standard of 
control – and, on the other hand, to illuminate what makes an error of assessment “manifest” 
and hence different from the errors normally caught by full judicial control. As the following 
paragraphs will explain, however, these efforts – albeit highly valuable – have not fully 
succeeded in eliminating the feeling of elusiveness that surrounds the marginal review of 
complex economic appraisals. 
3.1. In Search of a Definition: What Is a ‘Complex Economic Assessment’? 
In brief: complex economic assessments are said to function as a “neon sign” communicating 
that a hands-off scrutiny is to follow. Indeed, where complex economic evaluations come 
onto the scene, the threshold the Commission has to surpass automatically lowers: only 
manifest errors in its appraisals threatening the lawfulness of its decision. Therefore, it is 
hardly surprising that some scholars have wondered what a “complex economic assessment” 
is in an attempt to specify and narrow down the pool of appraisals that may activate marginal 
review.
21
 
That said, however, it does not take much for one to realize that properly defining – let 
alone narrowing – the concept of “complex economic evaluations” is a task much easier said 
than done. No doubt, over the course of the years EU Courts have offered glimpses into their 
understanding of what a “complex economic appraisal” is. To name but a few, the definition 
of the relevant market,
22
 a conclusion that an undertaking holds a dominant position,
23
 a 
finding that a conduct amounts to an abuse of dominance,
24
 the weighing-up exercise under 
Article 101(3) TFEU,
25
 and ascertaining that a concentration “would significantly impede 
                                                          
21
See e.g. Geradin, Layne-Farrar and Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (OUP, 2012), pp. 386-387. 
22
Case T-301/04, Clearstream v. Commission, EU:T:2009:317, para 47; Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. 
Commission, para 482; Case T-151/05, NVV and Others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:144, para 53. 
23
Case T-210/01, General Electric v. Commission, EU:T:2005:456, paras. 60-64 and 121. 
24
See e.g. regarding predatory pricing as a form of abuse, Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom v. Commission, 
EU:C:2009:214, para 7, and Case T-340/03, France Télécom v. Commission, EU:T:2007:22, para 129. 
25
Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission, EU:T:2006:265, para 244. 
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effective competition” in the common market26 are all examples of assessments that, 
according to EU Courts, call for limited review.
27
 Nevertheless, how helpful these indications 
are is debatable, to say the least. Based on these examples, one cannot escape the feeling that 
the notion of “complex economic assessments” is a nearly all-encompassing term. To some 
extent, this impression is due to the intrinsic links of competition law with economics; since 
economics is omnipresent in competition analysis, the evaluations that the Commission 
performs are – in a sense – always economic in nature. For this reason, clarifying the criterion 
of “complexity” has been thought to be a more promising way of capturing the definitional 
ambit of the “complex economic assessments” concept. 
However, the criterion of “complexity” is immensely equivocal. To start with the 
“knowns”, it is clear that the factual complexity of the case does not suffice to turn the 
Commission’s appraisals into “complex economic” ones. For instance, in Holcim 
(Deutschland), the General Court clarified that although Cement was a “particularly complex 
case” in factual terms, “the classification of the conduct of the undertakings concerned as 
constituting or not constituting an infringement for the purposes of Article [101(1) TFEU] fell 
… within the scope of the simple application of the law” and did not entail a complex 
economic assessment.
28
 Along similar lines, Forwood accurately pointed out that complexity 
“refers more to the nature of the assessment”, rather than its economic or technical aspects or 
its evidential implications.
29
 Accordingly, the complexity of the evaluation should be 
distinguished from its difficulty: complex appraisals may be difficult, but difficult appraisals 
are not necessarily complex.
30
 
Nevertheless, although these clarifications are most definitely valuable, they do not reveal 
what affirmative features an assessment must have to be classified as “complex”. In an 
attempt to shed some further light on the issue, Fritzsche posited that economic evaluations 
are “complex” when “they can only be determined by interpreting multiple other simple and 
complex facts” and that complex economic appraisals are essentially “factual questions as a 
matter of law to be answered by using scientific evidence”.31 These definitions, however, are 
unsatisfactory in at least two respects. On the one hand, equating complex economic 
assessments with “factual questions” disregards not only the role that the law plays in their 
construction, but also their own role in the construction of the law – as will be expounded 
briefly.
32
 On the other hand, the requirement for the use of scientific evidence not only leaves 
open the question what precisely “scientific evidence” may entail, but it also sits 
                                                          
26
Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v. Commission (Kali & Salz), EU:C:1998:148, paras. 
223-224; Case T-342/07, Ryanair v. Commission, EU:T:2010:280, paras. 29-30; Case T-119/02, Royal Philips 
Electronics v. Commission, EU:T:2003:101, para 77. 
27See also Bronckers and Valery, “Business as usual after Menarini?”, 3 MLexMagazine (2012), 44-47, at 45. 
28
Case T-28/03, Holcim (Deutschland) v. Commission, EU:T:2005:139, paras. 95-115. 
29Forwood, “The Commission’s ‘more economic approach’ – Implications for the role of the EU Courts, the 
treatment of economic evidence and the scope of judicial review” in Ehlermann and Marquis, op. cit. supra note 
5, p. 267. 
30Ibid., 265. See also Geradin and Petit, “Judicial review in European Union competition law: A quantitative and 
qualitative assessment” in Merola and Derenne, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 49. Cf. Fritzsche, op. cit. supra note 12, 
at 377, who seems to be unsure about whether such complexity “can and should be an argument for discretion”. 
31
Fritzsche, op. cit. supra note 12, at 398 and 396. 
32
See infra, sections 4.1 and 5.3. 
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uncomfortably with now settled case law according to which economic analysis need not be 
conducted on the basis of economic evidence.
33
 
Probably more orthodox, but still controversial, is Jaeger’s understanding of “complex 
economic assessments”. In his view, the attribute of complexity should be accredited only to 
assessments involving “elements of economic policy”, which call for some degree of “value 
judgement” on part of the Commission – such as the balancing of anticompetitive effects and 
efficiencies.
34
 According to Jaeger, all other economic evaluations – for instance, market 
definition or the existence of dominance – should be subject to full review as non-complex 
appraisals. This definition and examples strongly bring to mind Bellamy’s distinction 
between “facts of an economic nature” and “facts that are entering the question of policy”.35 
Neither demarcation, however, is as clear as one would wish. For a start, speaking of market 
definition or dominance as “facts of an economic nature” again demotes the contribution of 
the law in the performance of those evaluations. Indeed, market definition, for instance, is not 
merely a factual assessment; to define the market, the Commission is required to take into 
account a range of legal criteria as established by EU Courts. Although this does not 
necessarily turn assessments of this kind into “complex” ones for the purposes of marginal 
review, it does not allow their reduction to purely factual questions either. Even more 
problematic, however, is the idea that economic appraisals should be considered as 
“complex” when they are policy-related, as allegedly in the case of the balancing of the 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the conduct in question. The strongest criticism 
against this proposed distinction derives from the fact that it equates complexity with 
discretion. Although value judgements may well be complex, complex economic evaluations 
do not necessarily entail value judgements.
36
 To take the balancing of the anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects of a conduct as an example, this exercise certainly involves some 
degree of estimation, for the effects of the conduct may not be easy to discern, quantify and 
weigh.
37
 At the case-specific level, however, it does not require ipso facto a choice between 
different public interests or goals and thus a “value judgement”.38 Rather, its “complexity” 
                                                          
33
Case T-210/01, General Electric v. Commission, EU:T:2005:456, paras. 296-297 and 299; Case T-342/07, 
Ryanair v. Commission, paras. 132 and 136; Case T-175/12, Deutsche Börse v. Commission, EU:T:2015:148, 
paras. 131-136. 
34Jaeger, “The standard of review in competition cases involving complex economic assessments: Towards the 
marginalisation of the marginal review?”, 2 JECL&Pract. (2011), 295-314, at 310. 
35Bellamy, “Standards of proof in competition cases” in Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law (OECD 
Competition Policy Roundtable, 1996), p.106. 
36
It should be noted that the role of value judgements in economics has been long debated in a wealth of 
literature with views among authors diverging significantly. See, generally, Robbins, An Essay on the Nature 
and Significance of Economic Science (Macmillan, 1932); Boulding, “Economics as a moral science”, 59 The 
American Economic Review (1969), 1–12; Ng, “Value judgements and economists’ role in policy 
recommendation”, 82 The Economic Journal (1972), 1014-1018; Mongin, “Value judgements and value 
neutrality in economics”, 72 Economica (2006), 257–286. 
37
E.g. the Court explained in Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission, para 244, that the 
Commission must weigh up “the advantages expected from the implementation of the agreement and the 
disadvantages which the agreement entails for the final consumer, owing to its impact on competition” (see also 
para 248). 
38
This is not to say that value judgements may never be part of the balancing exercise. The role that the goal of 
market integration has played in the application of the EU competition rules constitutes probably the strongest 
evidence of the opposite (see, in this regard, Case C-56/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission and Case C-
501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission, especially paras. 59-61). Moreover, one must not ignore the 
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usually derives from the fact that the authority must take into account a multitude of relevant 
factors, whose systemic interaction may often be abstruse and may require a solid 
understanding of economics.
39
 Therefore, it is submitted that any description of complexity 
must be detached from the notion of discretion.
40
 
In any event, irrespective of one’s definitional preference, in principle the complexity of 
an economic evaluation should be established ad hoc. Regrettably, the practice of EU Courts 
so far has been to take its existence for granted. To some extent, this has exacerbated the 
elusiveness of the concept for the simple reason that certain economic evaluations may 
indeed be prone to “complexity” but in the circumstances of a given case they may not be 
complex at all. This will be particularly so where the method of constructing a complex 
economic evaluation has been consolidated over the years into more or less specific guidance. 
For instance, decades of enforcement and case law have generated specific scripts for the 
Commission to follow when it defines the market or finds that an undertaking holds a 
dominant position.
41
 As a result, market definition and dominance are now thought of as not-
as-complex appraisals – compared, say, to the balancing of anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects.
42
 Therefore, a static approach to the notion of complex economic 
evaluations seems unfit. 
3.2. A Rather Unhelpful Question: What Errors of Assessment Are “Manifest”? 
At any rate, the elusiveness of the marginal review of complex economic appraisals is 
reinforced by the ambiguous content of the “manifest error of assessment” test.43 At first 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ongoing debates over the goals of EU competition law either. This conversation, however, is primarily targeted 
at identifying what aims EU competition law should pursue in the first place, not how different public interests 
must be balanced in the context of the application of the EU competition rules (see e.g. Zimmer (Ed.), The 
Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2012)). As such, its relevance to the issues analysed in this article is 
far more limited than what one may initially think. 
39
See also Opinion of A.G. Léger in Case C-40/03 P, Rica Foods v. Commission, paras. 45-49. 
40
See op. cit. supra note 12. This is important for a further reason: the marginal review of policy matters is not 
of the same kind as that of complex economic evaluations (see also Opinion of A.G. Léger in Case C-40/03 P, 
Rica Foods v. Commission, para 49). Policy choices are usually controlled for their compliance with general 
principles of law, fundamental rights and proportionality (see e.g. Case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission, 
EU:T:2007:220 (on appeal: Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa, EU:C:2010:377) and Case T-133/07, 
Mitsubishi Electric Corp v. Commission, EU:T:2011:345, para 269. See also Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Joined 
Cases C-628/10 P & C-14/11 P, Alliance One International and Others v. Commission (Spanish tobacco), 
EU:C:2012:11, para 48). By contrast, complex economic evaluations are scrutinized on the basis of the Tetra 
Laval formula as described earlier (see supra note 18). 
41
See e.g. Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law, O.J. 1997, C 372/5, or Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, O.J. 2009, C 45/7, paras. 9-18. 
42E.g. although market definition is typically classified as a “complex economic appraisal”, on a number of 
occasions EU Courts have not hesitated to review the Commission’s definition of the market very closely and 
either uphold or dismiss it. See Case T-57/01, Solvay v. Commission, EU:T:2009:519; Case T-321/05, 
AstraZeneca v. Commission, EU:T:2010:266; Case T-427/08, CEAHR v. Commission, EU:T:2010:517. 
43
The concept of the manifest error of assessment has been discussed at great length in the legal scholarship. See 
e.g. Van der Esch, Pouvoirs Discrétionnaires de l’Exécutif Européen et Control Juridictionnel (Dalloz, 1968); 
Ritleng, “Le juge communautaire de la légalité et le pouvoir discrétionnaire des Institutions communautaires”, 9 
L’Actualité Juridique: Droit Administratif (1999), 645-657; Molinier, “Le contrôle juridictionnel et ses limites: 
À propos du pouvoir discrétionnaire des institutions communautaires” in Rideau (Ed.), De la Communauté de 
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glance, the qualification of “manifestness” creates the impression that EU Courts will 
intervene only in exceptional circumstances, that is, when the Commission’s conclusions are 
manifestly incorrect.
44
 This feeling would not be entirely unwarranted in light of the early 
definition of “manifestness” provided in RJB Mining. Albeit in the context of the ECSC 
Treaty, the Court clarified that “the term ‘manifest’ … presupposes that the failure to observe 
legal provisions … appears to arise from an obvious error in the evaluation”.45 Arguably, one 
might take the view that from a purely linguistic perspective an “obvious error” threshold 
signifies a prima facie higher bar for the Commission to surpass, compared to the “manifest 
error” wording. Nevertheless, the question remains: what errors in the Commission’s 
evaluations are “obvious” and how can these be distinguished from other non-obvious 
mistakes? 
In this regard, the approach taken in Ufex and Others appears slightly more helpful. As 
the General Court explained, an error of assessment is not manifest and would not suffice to 
warrant annulment of the contested Commission decision, “if, in the particular circumstances 
of the case, it could not have had a decisive effect on the outcome”.46 Following this 
clarification, errors of assessment can be said to be “manifest” when they could have led the 
authority to a different conclusion. By contrast, EU Courts are indifferent to errors that are 
not capable of modifying the outcome of the Commission’s analysis. This clarification is 
certainly valuable, insofar as it sheds some light on the judicial understanding of what 
“manifestness” entails. Nevertheless, one cannot but observe that abstractly defining the 
notion of “manifestness” is of limited practical value. Indeed, the “obvious error” language 
suffers from the same vagueness as the “manifest error of assessment” formula, whereas both 
these formulations fail to expose why a given Commission appraisal may be problematic and 
judicial intervention is thus warranted. 
4. “Complex Economic Appraisals” and Marginal Review in EU 
Competition Enforcement: A Look under the Surface 
The efforts to define the concept of “complex economic assessments” and determine what 
makes an error of assessment “manifest” have certainly gone some way towards illuminating 
the specifics of marginal review in EU competition enforcement. However, they have not 
fully elucidated its operation. This article seeks to contribute to the endeavours to understand 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Droit à l'Union de Droit (LGDJ, 2000), pp. 77-98; Bouveresse, Le Pouvoir Discrétionnaire dans l’Ordre 
Juridique Communautaire (Bruylant, 2010). 
44
See e.g. Derenne, “The scope of judicial review in EU economic cases” in Merola and Derenne, op. cit. supra 
note 5, p.85: “One can wonder why it is still acceptable and compatible with a satisfactory level of ‘justice’ for 
the Court to decide that a contested act is ‘not manifestly incorrect.” 
45
Case T-156/98, RJB Mining v. Commission, EU:T:2001:29, para 87 (emphasis added). 
46
Case T-60/05, Ufex and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2007:269, para 77. See also Case T-126/99, Graphischer 
Maschinenbau v. Commission, EU:T:2002:116, paras. 48-49 (albeit in the context of State aid), and Joined 
Cases C-553 & 554/10 P, Commission v. Editions Odile and Lagardère, EU:C:2012:682, para 37. It is 
interesting to note that the EU Courts’ understanding of “manifestness” echoes settled case law according to 
which violations of procedural guarantees may result in the annulment of a Commission decision only where the 
outcome of the administrative proceedings might have been different in the absence of the procedural defect; see 
Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114/73, Suiker Unie and Others v. Commission, EU:C:1975:174, 
para 91. 
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the limited control of complex economic evaluations by looking at the topic from a different 
perspective. First of all, instead of focusing on what a complex economic appraisal is, it 
strives to understand when “complex economic assessments” may be made as part of the 
intellectual process that the Commission must go through in order to reach a decision on 
whether a conduct violates Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or a merger is incompatible with the 
common market. In this way, the article avoids getting carried away in the somewhat abstract 
pursuit of a workable definition of “complex economic appraisals”, whilst, at the same time, 
it takes a deeper look at the precise need for such appraisals in the Commission’s analysis. 
Secondly, instead of trying to decipher the notion of “manifestness”, the present article adopts 
an inferential approach to the content of marginal review and examines the competition case 
law of the EU Courts with a view to identifying what may make for a “manifest error of 
assessment”. The value of this deliberate shift in the question lies in its capacity to avoid the 
assumption that the marginal review of complex economic appraisals is concerned with errors 
of a single kind and quality. Then, for the sake of completeness, the article engages in the 
reverse exercise and contemplates what may not make for a “manifest error of assessment”. 
4.1. The Making of Complex Economic Assessments 
Rather oddly – if one recalls the allegedly exceptional nature of marginal review - EU Courts 
have brought a diverse assortment of assessments under the “complex economic evaluation” 
label. As mentioned earlier, the finding of dominance, the definition of the relevant market, 
the existence of an abuse in the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, the balancing of the 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of a conduct, the conclusion that a concentration 
would or would not significantly impede effective competition in the common market if 
allowed to proceed, are all examples of appraisals that in principle qualify for marginal 
review and are to be scrutinized under the “manifest error” formula.47 Nevertheless, one 
should not jump to conclusions. To understand how complex economic evaluations are 
reviewed by EU Courts, it is necessary to move beyond the “finished product” and 
contemplate the context of their production. 
In this regard, it is critical to appreciate that complex economic appraisals are not 
performed in the abstract. Rather, they form part of the intellectual process that the 
Commission goes through when it makes a decision on whether the conduct in question 
complies with EU competition rules or not. In brief, this intellectual process unfolds into 
three levels, which are top-down the following. At the first level, the authority must select the 
proper legal basis for its enforcement action. In simple words, this means deciding whether to 
proceed on the basis of Article 101 TFEU and/or Article 102 TFEU, or under the Merger 
Regulation (EUMR). However, the legal rules encapsulated in these provisions are drafted in 
an open-textured manner. As a result, they are of little meaning without further specification. 
Indeed, the legal prohibitions on “restrictions of competition”, “abuses of dominance” and 
“concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition on the common 
market” are too vague to be operational as such. Therefore, they need to be interpreted and 
further specified into concrete legal tests. This exercise reflects the second level of the 
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Commission’s analysis. In practice, it means that the authority must consider what 
combination of conduct, conditions and outcome may bring a practice within the prohibitive 
scope of Article 101 TFEU or Article 102 TFEU or the EUMR. Finally, having identified the 
relevant legal test, at a third level, the Commission must examine whether the behaviour 
under investigation satisfies its elements and should thus be prohibited. 
Obviously, real-life enforcement is not as neat as this framework implies. 
Notwithstanding, breaking down the different levels of the intellectual process the 
Commission goes through in its decision-making offers a useful starting point for us to 
understand when complex economic appraisals may be necessary. With this in mind, one may 
distinguish the following two situations that may call for the performance of complex 
economic assessments. 
First of all, complex economic evaluations are sometimes necessary at the second level of 
the Commission’s analysis, that is, when the authority specifies the applicable legal rule and 
selects the relevant legal test. Indeed, the boundaries of EU competition provisions are 
shaped case by case. In consequence, there is no exhaustive “database” of legal tests for the 
authority to choose from. Although decades of enforcement have confirmed the merits and 
specifics of antitrust intervention in relation to a wide range of practices, such as, for 
instance, cartels or predatory pricing, the proper legal treatment of other economic activities, 
such as rebates offered by dominant firms, may be less clear or even vigorously disputed. 
Furthermore, markets and technology are constantly evolving. As a result, new business 
practices may make their appearance and novel legal issues may emerge. In these 
circumstances, the Commission may sooner or later find itself confronted with a difficult 
dilemma: is the conduct at hand of the kind that triggers the application of EU competition 
rules or not? If so, under what conditions should it be prohibited? More likely than not, the 
answer to these questions will require a complex economic evaluation. In addition to 
scanning the EU Courts’ jurisprudence in search for potentially transposable precedents, the 
authority will have to look into contemporary economic theory in order to identify the 
possible ways in which the behaviour in question may harm or – conversely – benefit 
consumers. Furthermore, it may also have to guesstimate the potential of the one or the other 
legal test to chill future procompetitive behaviour or encourage anticompetitive action. The 
ongoing Google investigation offers a prime example of the challenges that the Commission 
may have to overcome at this level of its analysis, as well as of the complex economic 
appraisals that it may need to perform.
48
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Case COMP/AT.39740, Google Search. As is well known, for the last 5 years the Commission has been 
investigating Google for allegedly engaging in a number of potentially abusive practices, including the way in 
which the company displays specialized search services, its use of content from competing specialized search 
services and the imposition of exclusivity requirements and other allegedly undue restrictions on advertisers. 
Recently and after three failed attempts at resolving the matter through commitments, the Commission sent 
Google a Statement of Objections expressing concerns about the company’s systematic favouring of its own 
comparison shopping services, whereas the investigation is still pending in relation to the remaining 3 practices 
(see <www.ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740>). Irrespective of the 
outcome of the proceedings, however, the vigorous debates over whether Google’s practices should be classified 
as “abusive” in the meaning of Art. 102 TFEU illustrate already the kind of questions the Commission must ask 
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Secondly, complex economic evaluations are often part of the analysis that the authority 
undertakes at the third level, that is, when it considers whether the conduct under 
investigation fulfils the elements of the relevant legal test. To answer this question, the 
Commission must embark on a double task. On the one hand, it must ascertain what 
happened or is happening in the market.
49
 On the other hand, it must conclude whether the 
factual picture in front of it can be legally qualified as a “restriction of competition”, “abuse 
of dominance” or “significant impediment to effective competition” in light of the applicable 
legal test. At this stage, the Commission’s analysis very much resembles assembling a puzzle: 
the authority seeks to gather the relevant information and integrate it into a meaningful 
picture. However, not all puzzles are created equal: some are easy to put together, others are 
doable, but more complicated, whereas sometimes a puzzle may be impossible to complete, 
for example because important pieces are missing or because it is just too large and intricate 
for the person who tries to assemble it. By analogy, not all legal qualifications are equally 
demanding. Sometimes, this exercise will be straightforward, other times it will be difficult, 
and from time to time it may require complex economic appraisals. The latter will most likely 
be the case the less accepted or more novel the economic theory on which the authority relies, 
the greater the number of relevant factors that it must integrate in its analysis, the more 
uncertain their interaction is, the more specialized the knowledge that the analysis requires 
and the more elaborate the argument the authority wishes to advance. 
The above account already reveals that complex economic assessments are not as 
homogeneous a group as one might initially assume. Although they are collectively grouped 
together under the same label, in reality they come in different shapes, sizes and hues – 
largely depending on the level of the Commission’s analysis at which they are performed. In 
any event, one must not forget that complex economic evaluations are not made out of thin 
air, nor do they have mystical properties making them completely inaccessible to EU judges. 
Rather, they are a mix of facts and law moulded together into a meaningful construct through 
economics. Bearing this in mind is critical in order to understand how complex economic 
appraisals are scrutinized by EU Courts. 
4.2. What Makes for a “Manifest Error of Assessment”? 
At the heart of the marginal review of complex economic appraisals lies the “manifest error 
of assessment” test. Therefore, any effort to illuminate marginal review requires considering 
what this test entails. As explained earlier, the “manifestness” qualification is of little help 
insofar as it does not unmask the reasons why a complex economic appraisal may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
itself when it investigates a potential violation of EU competition rules. See e.g. Nazzini, “Google and the (ever-
stretching) boundaries of Article 102 TFEU”, 6 JECL&Pract. (2015), 301-314; Lang, “Comparing Microsoft and 
Google: The concept of exclusionary abuse”, 39 World Comp. (2016), 5-28. 
49
In this context, the Commission faces a number of factual questions, e.g.: Which companies operate in the 
industry? What products do they market? What are their costs? What are their market shares? How do they 
distribute their products? What communication do market participants have with each other or had they in the 
past? What is or was the subject of their communication? Are there intellectual property rights registered under 
the name of the investigated firm or its competitors? Does one or the other market operator offer rebates to its 
distributors? What are the conditions of this rebate scheme? What is the internal strategy of company A or B? 
Can products X and Y be used for the same purpose? Have new firms entered the market in the past years? etc. 
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“erroneous”. Accordingly, a more meaningful question to ask is why a complex economic 
evaluation may fail judicial scrutiny. With this in mind, the following paragraphs look into 
the competition case law of EU Courts in order to infer the vices that may taint a complex 
economic appraisal and make it “manifestly erroneous”. Based on the way in which the 
“manifest error of assessment” test has been applied by EU judges, it appears that four types 
of errors may cause the annulment of the Commission’s decision where a marginal standard 
of scrutiny is applied. 
First of all, the Commission’s complex economic evaluations will not withstand judicial 
scrutiny where the authority has failed to assess correctly the material facts underpinning its 
analysis. For example, in AKZO, the ECJ held that the Commission was wrong to find that 
AKZO had engaged in an abusive policy of discrimination by quoting to customers of its 
competitor prices that were more advantageous than those it charged customers of its own.
50
 
As the Court explained, contrary to the Commission’s finding, the two categories of 
customers were not in fact comparable and thus the authority’s conclusion could not be 
sustained.
51
 Similarly, in Impala, the General Court took issue with the Commission’s finding 
that the market was not sufficiently transparent for collective dominance to exist.
52
 Indeed, 
the authority had eventually allowed Bertelsmann and Sony to merge their global recorded 
music businesses, among other reasons, on the ground that campaign discounts were 
rendering the market opaque. Scrutinizing, however, the Commission’s decision, the Court 
took the view that not only was its reasoning insufficient and inconsistent, but also it was not 
supported by the evidence that suggested that the relevant market was rather transparent.
53
 
Consequently, the authority’s subsequent economic analysis was predicated on a factually 
incorrect premise. 
Secondly, complex economic evaluations will fail to pass the “manifest error of 
assessment” test where the authority has not taken into account key relevant factors. For 
instance, in United Brands the Court reprimanded the Commission for concluding that UBC 
had abused its dominance by charging its customers unfair prices without taking into account 
UBC’s production costs when determining whether its prices were excessive in relation to the 
economic value of the product.
54
 Similarly, in Airtours the Commission’s finding that the 
market was conducive to tacit collusion due, among other reasons, to the stability of historic 
market shares, was dismissed by the General Court as “manifestly erroneous” on the ground 
that the authority had failed to take into account growth by acquisition when assessing the 
volatility of market shares.
55
 Along similar lines, in Schneider the General Court criticized 
the Commission’s analysis on the ground that the authority failed to consider the effects of 
the concentration in each national market separately, but rather based its findings on the 
transnational effects of the merger.
56
 Last but not least, in Tetra Laval the General Court 
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Case C-62/86, AKZO v. Commission, EU:C:1991:286. 
51
Ibid., paras. 116-121. 
52
Case T-464/04, Impala v. Commission, EU:T:2006:216. 
53
Ibid., paras. 364-390. 
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Case C-27/76, United Brands v. Commission, EU:C:1978:22, paras. 252-256. 
55
Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, EU:T:2002:146, paras. 109-119. 
56
Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric v. Commission, EU:T:2002:254, paras. 153-191. 
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reproached the Commission for its failure to take into account the behavioural commitments 
offered by Tetra when assessing the likelihood that the merged entity would indeed engage in 
anticompetitive leveraging practices.
57
 
Thirdly, a complex economic appraisal may be found “manifestly erroneous” where the 
authority has based its analysis on an irrelevant factor. Understandably, examples of this type 
of “manifest error of assessment” are not very common. Nevertheless, they do exist. For 
instance, in Airtours, the General Court took issue with the Commission’s conclusion that the 
foreseeable reactions of current and future competitors would not jeopardize the results 
expected from the larger tour operators’ common policy on the ground that it was based on 
the difficulties that smaller tour operators would have in reaching the minimum size at which 
they are capable of competing effectively with the four large operators.
58
 According to the 
General Court, however, these arguments were “immaterial”; the authority should have 
instead assessed the ability of smaller operators and new entrants to increase capacity in order 
to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by product shortages, which would allegedly 
arise if the operation were approved.
59
 A similar, albeit slightly different, error was committed 
by the Commission in Impala, where the General Court reproved the authority for basing its 
assessment of market transparency on campaign discounts without paying any thought to the 
pertinence of this criterion.
60
 
Fourthly, a complex economic evaluation may be “manifestly erroneous” where the 
supporting evidence fails to satisfy the standard of proof. This is probably the most common 
form a “manifest error of assessment” may take. While it is often confused with the faults 
described so far, a failure to meet the standard of proof may be a vice in its own right. Indeed, 
even where the Commission has not made erroneous factual findings and has taken into 
account all the pertinent factors or has not based its analysis on irrelevant parameters, its 
complex economic evaluations may still fail marginal review where the authority has not 
produced sufficient evidence. In these circumstances, the Commission has not necessarily 
“got it wrong”. However, it has not convincingly demonstrated that it has “got it right” either. 
Examples of this kind of “manifest error of assessment” abound in the case law of EU Courts. 
For instance, in United Brands, the Court held that the Commission should not have 
concluded that UBC abused its dominance by imposing unfair prices for the sale of Chiquita 
bananas on its customers in BENELUX, Denmark and Germany, among other reasons, 
because it had not produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the prices charged in 
Ireland were indeed representative before using them as benchmark for finding that the prices 
in the other Member States were excessively high.
61
 Similarly, in General Electric, the 
General Court concluded that the Commission’s finding that the foreseen conduct was of a 
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Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Commission, EU:T:2002:264, para 161 (upheld on appeal: Case C-12/03 P, 
Commission v. Tetra Laval, EU:C:2005:87, paras. 85-89). See also Case T-210/01, General Electric v. 
Commission, paras. 309-312. 
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Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, paras. 211-215. 
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Ibid., para 214. 
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Case T-464/04, Impala v. Commission, paras. 437-458, particularly para 449. 
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Case C-27/76, United Brands v. Commission, paras. 235-268 (the reason for this was that there was evidence 
suggesting that the prices charged in Ireland had actually produced loss for UBC, and although that evidence 
was not very reliable, it was still for the Commission to prove the issue since it bore the burden of proof). 
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strategic nature did not satisfy the standard of proof, insofar as the authority failed to produce 
evidence as to the likelihood that General Electric would adopt the contemplated conduct.
62
 
Likewise, in Airtours, the Commission failed to satisfy its burden of proof insofar as it failed 
to demonstrate that the result of the transaction would be to alter the structure of the relevant 
market in such a way that the leading operators would no longer act as they have in the past 
and thus a collective dominance would be created.
63
 Last but not least, in CEAHR, the 
General Court took issue with the Commission’s market definition on the ground that the 
authority had not satisfied the standard of proof when taking the view that a price increase in 
the market for spare parts for luxury watches would have led consumers to switch to other 
spare parts or to other primary products.
64
 
Therefore, a closer analysis of the EU Courts’ case law confirms that thinking of 
“manifest errors of assessment” as comprising mistakes of a single quality is inaccurate. 
Indeed, different flaws appear to have been subsumed within the rather generic concept of 
“manifest error of assessment”. Interestingly enough, these flaws are at heart errors of fact – 
where the factual basis of the Commission’s “complex economic appraisal” is at odds with 
“reality” as judicially ascertained, or has not been sufficiently established by the authority, 
and errors of law – where the Commission’s legal characterization of the facts has not been 
performed on the basis of all relevant factors or has been premised on an immaterial 
consideration that has vitiated its overall analysis.
65
 This finding accords with the earlier 
remark that the main ingredients of complex economic assessments are fundamentally facts 
and law. 
4.3. What Does not Make for a “Manifest Error of Assessment”? 
Having considered the possible deficiencies in the Commission’s complex economic 
appraisals that may amount to a “manifest error of assessment”, it is appropriate to give some 
thought to the reverse question, i.e. what does not make for a “manifest error of assessment”. 
This will allow us to better identify the outer boundaries, on the one hand, of the 
Commission’s margin of appreciation and, on the other hand, of the EU Courts’ power of 
review. 
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Council, EU:T:2007:85, paras. 65-66). 
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In this regard, it is first of all important to recall the wording of Article 263 TFEU, which 
confines the scrutiny of EU Courts to a review of the legality of the Commission’s decisions. 
In practice, this means that EU Courts may not annul the authority’s complex economic 
assessment on the ground that another possible approach to the matter was in their view 
“better”, nor can they provide an incorrect Commission decision with different grounds and 
uphold it.
66
 As the General Court elaborated in GSK Services, “it is not for the Court to 
substitute its own economic assessment for that of the institution which adopted the 
decision”; it may only review its lawfulness.67 This constraint is crucial for demarcating the 
limits of marginal review. Indeed, where complex economic assessments are involved, there 
may be more “correct” ways of approaching an issue, from which the authority is in principle 
entitled to choose as the first instance decision-maker.
68
 For example, the same concentration 
may give rise to both unilateral and coordinated effects. If the Commission opts to proceed on 
the basis of the unilateral effects theory only, the EU Courts may not find a “manifest error of 
assessment” on the ground that in their view the alternative theory was more convincing or 
appropriate. To put it differently: the mere fact that the authority pursued a line of analysis 
that EU Courts would not have favoured had they been the first instance decision-maker is 
insufficient to give rise to a “manifest error of assessment”. 
In any event, the Commission’s margin of appreciation is not exhausted in choosing a 
theory of harm, but may extend to the very performance of the complex economic appraisals. 
An illustrative example of this situation may be found in John Deere.
69
 In this case, the 
Commission took issue with the information exchange system operated by UK tractor 
manufacturers on the ground that it increased transparency on a highly concentrated market 
and raised barriers to entry by enabling members to identify each competitor’s sales as well 
as the sales made by their dealers, where the total volume of sales for a given product and 
period on the territory was less than ten units. Challenging the decision, John Deere contested 
the threshold of ten units below which individualization of information was possible as 
“incomprehensible”.70 However, neither the General Court nor the ECJ shared its view. 
Taking account of the characteristics of the market, the kind of information exchanged and 
the fact that the disseminated information was not sufficiently aggregated, the General Court 
held that “the Commission, … without committing any manifest error of assessment, was 
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entitled to set at ten units the number of vehicles sold in a given dealer territory as the figure 
below which it is possible to identify sales made by each of the competitors”.71 
The same position was endorsed by the ECJ on appeal. Recalling that “complex economic 
appraisals” are subject to limited review, the Court explained that “the setting of the criterion 
preventing exact identification of competitors’ sales is based on a complex economic 
appraisal of the market” and thus the General Court was right to undertake a limited review 
only and find that the Commission had not committed any manifest error in using the 
criterion of ten units sold.
72
 A comparable conclusion may be found in the ECJ’s earlier 
judgment in Remia. Examining Remia’s challenge that the Commission’s decision to reduce 
the non-compete clause from ten to four years was based on an incorrect appraisal of the 
specific circumstances of the case, the ECJ recalled that “complex economic evaluations” are 
subject to limited review. Having then regard to the criteria examined by the Commission 
when determining the proper duration of the non-compete clause, the Court concluded that 
there was nothing to suggest that the authority had committed a manifest error of 
assessment.
73
 Therefore, one may infer that where a “complex economic appraisal” requires 
setting a numerical threshold, some scope for calibration appears to be part and parcel of the 
Commission’s margin of appreciation. 
That said, a final remark is critical. The operation of the “manifest error of assessment” 
test – as described earlier - reveals that the Commission may not shield behind its margin of 
appreciation, where it has failed to assess the key facts of the case correctly or sufficiently, or 
to consider a materially relevant factor, or where it has based its analysis on an irrelevant 
factor that has vitiated its conclusions. By contrast, errors in non-material factual findings or 
a failure to take into consideration factors that are not substantially relevant will not make for 
“manifest errors of assessment”. This sits very well with the General Court’s position in Ufex 
and Others, where it was clarified that the “manifest error of assessment” test may only cover 
errors which could have had a “decisive effect on the outcome”.74 By definition, mistakes in 
supplementary or peripheral factual findings and omissions relating to parameters that are not 
key to performing the “complex economic evaluation” in question may not modify the 
outcome of the Commission’s analysis. Therefore, ineffective deficiencies in the authority’s 
analysis will not warrant its annulment. 
5. The Three Aces up the EU Courts’ Sleeve 
The analysis of the EU Courts’ case law revealed that the “manifest error of assessment” test 
encompasses specific defects that may cause the annulment of the Commission’s decision, 
whether independently or in combination. This finding is important because it confirms that 
the marginal review of complex economic evaluations in EU competition enforcement is not 
an intangible standard of judicial scrutiny nor is its operation contingent on an abstract – and 
potentially arbitrary – perception of “manifestness”. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not 
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fully explain away the feeling which is commonly shared among academics, that is, that 
marginal review is in practice far less marginal than its name implies – especially in the field 
of merger control.
75
 To understand this widespread sentiment, it is necessary to pay some 
thought to the tools that EU Courts may engage when they scrutinize the Commission’s 
decision-making: economics, evidence review and Article 19(1) TEU. As will be explained, 
these three “aces” up the EU judges’ sleeve may enable them practically to shrink – if not 
entirely eliminate – any margin of appreciation the Commission is thought to enjoy. 
5.1. Ace One: Economics 
Judicial deference to the Commission’s complex economic assessments is typically explained 
on efficiency grounds. Indeed, over the course of the years the Commission has improved the 
quality of its decision-making by introducing internal checks and balances and has increased 
its capacity in economics by establishing a special department headed by the Chief 
Economist and run with the help of a group of highly-qualified economists.
76
 Unsurprisingly, 
this has strengthened the authority’s capacity to perform complex economic evaluations and 
double-check their soundness. Comparing the Commission’s nature as a specialized agency 
with the EU judges’ generalist background, it makes sense – as the argument goes – to allow 
it a degree of leeway in its appreciation.
77
 Without any intention to contest the merits of this 
efficiency rationale, the present article rather wishes to make a different – and somewhat 
underestimated – point: that irrespective of any “comparative advantage” that the 
Commission may enjoy in terms of “expertise” and experience, economics is not the 
Commission’s sole prerogative; rather, in the context of marginal review it may actually serve 
as a double-edged sword.
78
 
Indeed, economics may provide the Commission with a strong foundation for the exercise 
of its margin of appreciation. At the policy level, soft-law instruments published by the 
authority offer an illustrative example of this. Drawing, among others, upon contemporary 
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economic theory, these documents set out the authority’s enforcement priorities and expound 
its approach to various types of potentially harmful market conduct.
79
 Furthermore, 
economics often comes to the Commission’s defence at a case-specific level, too. For 
instance, in Deutsche Börse, the General Court upheld the Commission’s finding that the 
trading of derivatives similar to exchange-traded derivatives (EDT look-alikes) was a 
relatively limited phenomenon not only on the basis of the available factual evidence 
indicating that EDT lookalikes did not have the significance alleged by Deutsche Börse, but 
also in view of the fact that the economics of replicating an exchange-traded contract in the 
over-the-counter environment provided little justification for such a strategy.
80
 Likewise, in 
Der Grüne Punkt, the General Court agreed that the Commission rightly took into account 
considerations of spatial economics – in addition to collection logistics and traditions of 
waste collection, when assessing the conditions under which systems for the regular 
collection of used sales packaging from consumers could gain access to the latter..
81
 Last but 
not least, in Atlantic Container Line, the General Court acknowledged that according to 
economic theory the contestability of the liner shipping market was a “very controversial 
topic” and therefore the Commission should be granted a broad margin of appreciation in 
assessing the degree of contestability of the market in containerized liner shipping on the 
transatlantic route.
82
 In this light, the Commission’s conclusion that potential competition was 
insufficient to prevent the Trans-Atlantic Agreement from affording its members the 
possibility of eliminating competition within the meaning of Article 101(3) TFEU was not 
vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.
83
 
Nevertheless, the Commission’s reliance on economics may sometimes backfire. General 
Electric provides a clear example. In prohibiting the GE/Honeywell concentration as 
incompatible with the common market on account of its allegedly anticompetitive 
conglomerate effects, the authority found that the merged entity would have had an incentive 
to engage in mixed-bundling post-merger. This conclusion was based, among other things, on 
the “Cournot effect” of bundling, an economic theory which explains the advantages that a 
firm with a wide range of products may derive if it offers discounts on all the products in the 
range, where its competitors’ range is more restricted. Taking into account the produced 
expert economic evidence, the General Court observed that the question where the Cournot 
effect would have given the merged entity an incentive to engage in mixed bundling was a 
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“matter of controversy” and, therefore, the Commission was not entitled to infer such an 
incentive as a “direct and automatic consequence” of that theory.84 
 Airtours provides another illustrative example of how economics may be employed 
by the EU Courts for the purposes of scrutinizing the Commission’s decision-making. In 
finding that the merger would result in the creation of a collective dominant position, the 
authority took the view that, although demand volatility generally makes the creation of such 
a position more difficult, in the circumstances of the case that fact was not relevant, as the 
major operators tended to adopt a “wait and see” approach to capacity planning in order to 
protect themselves against any volatility.
85
 Reviewing the Commission’s analysis, however, 
the General Court held that the authority was not entitled to rely on the tour operators’ 
allegedly cautious approach to capacity decisions “for the purpose of denying the relevance 
in this instance of a factor which is significant as evidence of oligopolistic dominance, such 
as the degree of market stability and predictability”,86 and eventually concluded that the 
Commission had “failed to establish that economic theory was inapplicable in the present 
case and that it was wrong in concluding that volatility of demand was conducive to the 
creation of a dominant oligopoly .…”87 
More generally, the double function of economics in the context of the marginal review of 
“complex economic appraisals” derives from the key role that economic theory plays in 
shaping our perception of “economic normality”.88 Indeed, economics in competition 
enforcement often serves as the rough equivalent of “common sense” in everyday life. As 
such, it may shape judicial preconceptions, whilst at the same time offering a useful 
benchmark with which the “existing” situation, as factually established, may be compared.89 
This exercise is not always conscious, but it is certainly visible in the scrutiny to which EU 
Courts subject the Commission’s analysis. Tetra Laval exemplifies this point quite vividly. 
Annulling the Commission’s prohibition of the Tetra Laval/Sidel concentration as 
incompatible with the common market, the General Court stressed that “the effects of a 
conglomerate-type merger are generally considered to be neutral, or even beneficial, for 
competition on the markets concerned, as is recognized in the present case by the economic 
writings cited in the analyses annexed to the parties’ written pleadings”.90 Accordingly, it 
underlined that “the proof of anti-competitive conglomerate effects of such a merger calls for 
a precise examination, supported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances which 
allegedly produce those effects”.91 
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5.2. Ace Two: Evidence Review 
In any event, apart from economics, EU Courts have a second ace up their sleeve: evidence 
review. Indeed, the Commission’s margin of appreciation by no means dismisses EU Courts 
from their obligation to fully review the evidence supporting its conclusions. As Advocate 
General Kokott emphasized in her Opinion in Impala II, “the correctness, completeness and 
strength of the factual material which underpins a decision must be liable to judicial 
review”.92 This is critical because “without such a review of the factual basis for a decision it 
would not be possible to assess, in a meaningful way, whether the Commission had stayed 
within the limits of the discretion allowed to it or had committed manifest errors of 
assessment”.93 This approach is consistent with the principle of unfettered evaluation of the 
evidence. As the General Court has itself confirmed, “it is incumbent on it … to check the 
nature and import of the evidence taken into consideration by the Commission”.94 
Nevertheless, EU Courts have taken evidence review a step further: not only will they seek 
confirmation as to whether the evidence is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, but they 
will also verify whether it contains all the information which must be taken into account in 
order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions 
drawn from it.
95 96
 
The potential reach of the evidence-qualification of the “manifest error of assessment” 
test should not be underestimated. Indeed, evidence review in the context of marginal 
scrutiny has armed EU Courts with the perfect Trojan horse. On the one hand, it enables EU 
judges to evade potential allegations that they have unduly interfered with the Commission’s 
margin of appreciation – after all, all they do is merely review the evidence that the authority 
has produced. At the same time, however, the Tetra Laval formula has the capacity to turn 
marginal control into a much stricter form of judicial scrutiny, which may sometimes come 
very close to almost entirely eliminating any “margin of appreciation” that the Commission is 
said to enjoy.
97
 The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the evidence-qualification of the 
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“manifest error of assessment” test confirms that the Commission’s exercise98 of its margin of 
appreciation is subject to an important caveat: although the authority does possess “a degree 
of latitude regarding the choice of the econometric instruments available to it and the choice 
of the appropriate approach to the study of any matter”,99 it is nevertheless legally required to 
demonstrate that its chosen approach is justified and thus among the “correct” ones.100 
Secondly, the Tetra Laval formula suggests that EU Courts remain the ultimate arbiters of the 
factors that must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation. This is 
important because, as mentioned earlier, a failure to take into consideration parameters that 
are not substantially relevant will not make for a “manifest error of assessment”. In view of 
its margin of appreciation, one would expect that the Commission would have a strong say in 
determining what is “relevant” and what is not. Interestingly, however, EU Courts have 
employed evidence-related wording to retain this role for themselves.
101
 
Obviously, whether EU Courts actually deliver on their promise and do carry out an in-
depth scrutiny of the evidence is a different issue.
102
 Furthermore, in view of their generalist 
background, their ability to scrutinize complex economic evidence produced either by the 
Commission or the undertakings has been - unsurprisingly - questioned.
103
 However, this 
empirical question and practical difficulties do not detract from the theoretically far-reaching 
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potential of evidence review, as the perfect “cover” for performing a thorough inspection of 
the Commission’s analysis without – seemingly – impinging on the authority’s margin of 
appreciation.
104
 
5.3. Ace Three: Article 19(1) TEU 
Finally, EU Courts have a third powerful ace up their sleeve: Article 19(1) TEU. According to 
Article 105 TFEU, the Commission shall safeguard the application of EU competition rules. 
Nevertheless, this does not eliminate the EU Courts’ responsibility – but also power – to 
“ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”. The fact 
that EU Courts are entitled to ensure that “the law is observed” has very significant 
connotations for the judicial review of the Commission’s complex economic appraisals, 
which have not been fully appreciated so far. Indeed, it is usually assumed that all complex 
economic evaluations are subject to marginal control. Interestingly, however, the case law of 
the EU Courts provides little to no support for this assumption. Rather, the settled position 
seems to be that any margin of appreciation that the Commission potentially enjoys is 
confined to the application of the competition rules. By contrast, complex economic 
appraisals relating to their interpretation are treated as “pure” questions of law and are thus 
subject to full review.
105
 
To understand this distinction, it is necessary to recall the three stages of the intellectual 
process which the Commission must go through in order to decide on whether the EU 
competition rules have been complied with.  As explained earlier, these are, firstly, the 
identification of the relevant legal basis; secondly, the interpretation of the relevant legal 
basis through its specification into a concrete legal test; and thirdly, the application of the 
specified legal test to the facts of the case. Complex economic appraisals may be necessary 
both at the second and the third level of the authority’s analysis. Therefore, one might well 
assume that EU Courts apply a marginal standard of review to both “varieties” of complex 
economic evaluations. Such an assumption would be far from absurd – especially if one 
recalls the Commission’s nature as a specialized administrative agency, which arguably 
makes it well-equipped to take the lead on how the concepts “restriction of competition”, 
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“abuse of dominance” or “significant impediment to effective competition” should be 
interpreted.
106
 
At this point, it should be noted that the question whether – and, if so, under what 
circumstances – courts must defer to the administrative authorities’ interpretation of the law 
is not new. This issue emerges all the more forcefully in regulatory contexts, such as 
competition enforcement, where the meaning of the substantive law often rests on the current 
state of knowledge in other disciplines, such as economics, as well as on difficult predictions 
about the potential impact of the one or the other legal test on market conduct. In this light, it 
is hardly surprising that different jurisdictions have addressed the matter in different – 
sometimes diametrically opposite – ways.107 In the US, for instance, the Supreme Court has 
long endorsed the Chevron formula, which prescribes that if the Congress has not directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue and the statute is silent or ambiguous, then “the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute”.108 By contrast, matters of statutory interpretation in the UK appear to fall 
within the remit of the English courts, which may substitute their judgment for that of the 
agency.
109
 
Examining the position of EU Courts, there is nothing in the case law to support the 
assumption that the Commission enjoys a margin of appreciation in matters of law 
interpretation – even where complex economic evaluations may be involved. On the contrary, 
the meaning and scope of the EU competition rules have been invariably off-limits to the 
authority. Indeed, on several occasions EU Courts have confirmed that as a general rule they 
will undertake a comprehensive review of whether or not the conditions for the application of 
EU competition rules are met.
110
 Furthermore, they have repeatedly emphasized that in 
carrying out such a review, they “cannot use the Commission’s margin of discretion, by virtue 
of the role assigned to it in competition policy by the EU and FEU Treaties, as a basis for 
dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts”.111 In practice, 
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this means that the Commission’s interpretation of the EU competition rules – and therefore 
any complex economic appraisals that it may perform in that context – is always subject to 
full, rather than marginal review. The greatest proof of this is probably the striking lack of 
any deferential wording in those parts of the judgments that set out the constituent elements 
of the infringement. For instance, in Intel, the General Court considered in detail the proper 
legal treatment of rebates offered by dominant firms without making any reference to the 
Commission’s view on the matter or margin of appreciation, although one might well argue 
that this question entailed complex economic evaluations par excellence.
112
 Therefore, one 
may safely infer that any deference to the Commission is confined to the complex economic 
evaluations that the authority may perform at the stage of the application of the EU 
competition rules, their interpretation being the sole prerogative of the EU Courts in line with 
the mandate of Article 19(1) TEU. 
6. Conclusion 
Few topics in competition enforcement have troubled academics and practitioners alike as 
much as the marginal standard of review to which the Commission’s complex economic 
evaluations are subject. Although the “manifest error of assessment” test progressively 
became boilerplate in the judgments of EU Courts, its operation remains by and large 
wrapped in a cloud of elusiveness, in part due to the difficulties in defining the notion of 
complex economic appraisals and in part due to the somewhat “sibylline” description of 
marginal review by the European judges. 
Against this backdrop, the aspiration of this article was to contribute to academic 
endeavours to illuminate marginal review in EU competition enforcement by examining more 
closely the “manifest error of assessment” test that underpins the control of the Commission’s 
complex economic appraisals. In this light, the focus was placed on better understanding 
when such evaluations may be performed as part of the intellectual process that the 
Commission must go through in order to decide whether the EU competition rules have been 
complied with, and what errors in the authority’s analysis may make for a “manifest error of 
assessment” according to the case law of the EU Courts. As the article demonstrated, 
although complex economic appraisals are collectively grouped under the same label, they 
are not indistinguishable; rather, they come in different varieties which may in turn inform 
the kind of scrutiny that EU Courts exercise. Furthermore, the examination of the case law 
revealed that first impressions sometimes lie. Despite the apparent nebulousness of its 
wording, the “manifest error of assessment” test is not an intangible formula of judicial 
scrutiny, contingent on an abstract – and perhaps arbitrary – perception of “manifestness”. 
Rather, the marginal review of complex economic evaluations appears to target four specific 
defects that may – independently or in combination – invalidate the Commission’s analysis: 
failure to assess correctly the material facts of the case, failure to take into account a relevant 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
this dictum “has in itself the potential to neutralize de facto the very principle of the recognition of a margin of 
economic assessment to the Commission”. 
112
Case T-286/09, Intel v. Commission, EU:T:2014:547, paras. 72-94. 
Final Version 
27 
 
factor, taking into account an irrelevant factor that distorted the analysis and failure to satisfy 
the standard of proof. 
These findings already confirm that the manifest error of assessment test entails a far 
more thorough form of judicial scrutiny than what one might expect – or fear – based on the 
seemingly deferential language of the EU Courts. A closer look at the three tools that the EU 
Courts have employed to scrutinize the Commission’s complex economic appraisals, i.e. 
economics, evidence review and Article 19(1) TEU, offers further support for this conclusion. 
Indeed, although the Commission surely possesses a degree of sophistication in economics, 
the latter is not its sole prerogative. Rather, EU Courts have routinely relied on economic 
theory either to confirm the authority’s complex economic analysis or find fault with it. 
Moreover, the evidence-qualification of the “manifest error of assessment” test, as now 
entrenched in the case law, has provided EU Courts with the perfect Trojan horse. Under the 
cover of evidence review – which falls within their entitlement - EU judges have been able 
not only to retain the final say on whether the facts have been correctly and sufficiently 
established, but also – and most importantly – to remain the ultimate arbiters of what is 
“relevant” and what is not. Finally, in line with the mandate of Article 19(1) TEU, EU Courts 
have traditionally confined any deference to the Commission to the application of EU 
competition rules. By contrast, complex economic evaluations as part of their interpretation 
are subject to full review as pure questions of law. 
In conclusion, thinking of the judicial scrutiny of complex economic evaluations in EU 
competition enforcement in abstract or generic terms does not do justice to the nuanced 
approach of EU Courts. Unsurprisingly, there is more to it than meets the eye. 
